An Australian domestic-violence case has exposed how remote controls built into connected cars can be turned into tools of coercion. Enrico Pucci used access to his former partner's Tesla account to change vehicle settings, restrict when and how fast it could be driven, and interfere with charging, according to police documents reported by the Guardian.
The Sydney woman, identified under the pseudonym Stacey, discovered a parental-control profile on her car in November 2025 after its alarm sounded repeatedly overnight. She could not access the profile. Police records said Pucci subsequently changed the climate setting between extreme temperatures and activated Valet Mode, limiting the car to 40 kilometres per hour and creating safety concerns while she was driving. The controls also governed locks and curfew hours.
Pucci had previously offered to help Stacey manage the car's technology while they were a couple. She agreed to register the vehicle in his name for that purpose, the court documents said. After the relationship ended, he retained access through Tesla's app. Police recorded seven attempts to disconnect the vehicle from its charging port as part of conduct charged as using a carriage service to stalk or harass.
The technology-related acts formed part of a much broader case. Pucci pleaded guilty and was convicted of 30 domestic-violence offences, including stalking or intimidation, common assault, choking without consent and using a carriage service to threaten, menace or harass. Judge Peter Feather sentenced him to two years and three months, with a 15-month non-parole period. Pucci is appealing the sentence and is due back in court in late October.
In sentencing remarks quoted in the report, Feather described a four-year pattern designed to dominate Stacey and create dependency. The conduct included controlling the vehicle and fabricating employment opportunities that caused her to reject other work. The Guardian also recounted severe physical violence described in police documents. Those details establish that the car access was one method within sustained coercive control, rather than an isolated technology dispute.
The case illustrates a security gap that password-reset advice alone may not solve. Ownership records, app permissions, shared profiles and recovery processes can leave an abusive person with durable access to a physical device. In a connected vehicle, that access can affect mobility, temperature, locking and speed—not just expose information.
Manufacturers and service providers therefore need abuse-aware account recovery that lets a legitimate user discover linked identities, revoke remote privileges and regain control without alerting an abuser prematurely. Clear logs and trained support teams can also help victims document interference. Connected features offer convenience, but this prosecution demonstrates that their threat model must include intimate partners who obtained authorized access and then weaponized it.
