On Jan. 30, 2025, Corneille Nangaa, the leader of a rebel alliance that includes M23, said his forces would keep advancing in the Democratic Republic of Congo until they reached Kinshasa and toppled President Felix Tshisekedi’s government. The declaration followed the capture of Goma, the biggest city in eastern Congo, and the installation of what the rebels described as a new governing authority there.
Nangaa’s remarks sharpened an already volatile situation in the east. Unconfirmed reports suggested the rebels were pushing toward Bukavu, the second-largest city in the mineral-rich region, despite urgent appeals for a ceasefire. Tshisekedi said a vigorous and coordinated response was underway and vowed that Congo would not be humiliated or crushed. But the fighting had already done major damage: electricity and water in Goma were cut, food was scarce and about 500,000 people were forced from their homes.
The rebels framed themselves as administrators rather than occupiers, telling journalists they were there to restore services. Yet the scale of the offensive made that claim hard to square with the violence on the ground. The capital, Kinshasa, lies about 2,600 kilometers from Goma, which made a march to the center of power seem unlikely in military terms. Even so, the memory of 1997, when Rwanda-backed forces ousted Mobutu Sese Seko, gave Nangaa’s threat an unsettling historical echo.
The conflict also continued to redraw regional politics. Congo accuses Rwanda of backing M23 and even placing troops on Congolese territory; Rwanda denies direct military support and says Congo shelters Hutu militias linked to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The UN and the Southern African regional bloc both have peacekeepers in the east, but they failed to stop the rebel assault. Thirteen peacekeepers had already been killed, including South African troops, and relations between Kigali and Pretoria deteriorated further after President Paul Kagame said Rwanda was ready for a confrontation with South Africa if needed.
For civilians in eastern Congo, the immediate picture was simpler than any diplomatic dispute. Families were leaving homes, schools and clinics were under strain, and the humanitarian crisis deepened with each new front. Nangaa’s promise to go all the way to Kinshasa may or may not be militarily realistic, but it clearly signaled that the rebels did not see Goma as an endpoint. Instead, they were trying to turn territorial gains into a political project aimed at dismantling the government in the capital.
Nangaa’s declaration also showed how quickly a rebel military win can become a claim to state power. By announcing a new administration in Goma while threatening Kinshasa, the alliance tried to move the conflict from a local battlefield to a national legitimacy fight. Whether or not the rebels can march the full distance, the message to Tshisekedi is that the east can no longer be treated as a peripheral security problem. It has become a direct challenge to the center.
That larger goal is what makes the advance so destabilizing. Even if a march to Kinshasa never happens, the rebels are using the threat of one to force Congo and its partners to deal with them as a national political actor. The longer they hold territory and present themselves as administrators, the harder it becomes for Tshisekedi to argue that the crisis is contained to the east.
