Australia formally listed Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a state sponsor of terrorism, ABC News Australia reported. The move followed earlier disclosures by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and ASIO chief Mike Burgess that Iran had been behind at least two antisemitic attacks in Australia. In the packet, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke and Attorney-General Michelle Rowland described the listing as an important deterrent and disruption to terrorist activity.
The designation is significant because it is the first organisation to be listed under the new regime. The packet says legislation had passed parliament earlier in the month allowing the government to make such a designation, and that the IRGC became the first group to fall under it on Thursday. That means Australia did not simply condemn a foreign organisation; it created a legal mechanism and then used it.
Iran's reaction was fierce. The foreign ministry called the move illegal, unjustifiable and a violation of international rules and norms, and said Australia was acting in compliance with Israel's policies. The packet also says Iran's ambassador to Australia had already been expelled, which turned the diplomatic row into one of the sharpest between the two countries in years. Whatever one thinks of the political framing, the facts show a rapid escalation from intelligence disclosures to a formal terrorist listing and a severed diplomatic channel.
The source excerpt also records a broader argument over who pushed Australia into action. It says the Israeli government took credit for forcing the move, while Tony Burke rejected that claim as complete nonsense. That side note matters because it shows the decision being fought over in narrative terms as well as legal ones: Australia wanted the listing to be understood as its own response to domestic attacks, not as a move dictated by another country.
The policy effect is concrete. According to the packet, the listing puts members of the public on notice that the IRGC is now a state sponsor of terrorism under Australian law and that certain dealings with it are criminal offences. That is the practical heart of the decision: it changes the legal environment around contact with the organisation while signalling that attacks on Australian soil can produce consequences far beyond routine diplomatic protest.
The wider significance is that Australia is now using one of the strongest tools available short of sanctions or war to respond to foreign-linked violence at home. The packet does not say whether the listing will deter future attacks, but it does show the government treating the problem as both a security issue and a legal one. That combination is what makes the story important: it turns intelligence findings into a formal state position.
Because the designation turns a foreign military organisation into a criminal-law problem for Australians, the ripple effect will extend beyond the diplomatic row. Businesses, community groups and anyone with exposure to the IRGC now have to treat the regime change as a practical legal constraint, not just a statement of outrage.
