Sudanese Army Says It Seized More Areas in Blue Nile After Fighting RSF and SPLM-N

# Sudanese Army Says It Seized More Areas in Blue Nile After Fighting RSF and SPLM-N

*Event date: 2026-05-26*

By IO Digest Desk

Sudan’s army said on May 26, 2026 that it had taken control of three more areas in Blue Nile state after clashes with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and fighters allied with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, underscoring how the country’s war has spread into a region already marked by a long-running insurgency.

In a statement cited by AFP via TRT World, the military said its forces had “cleansed” Ab Dagla, Adi Washambo and Um Shanqir of RSF fighters and their SPLM-N allies. The army also said it seized several combat vehicles and pursued withdrawing forces toward the borders with Ethiopia and South Sudan. There was no immediate response from either the RSF or the SPLM-N in the report.

The announcement followed earlier military claims of gains in the same state. On Sunday, the army said it had taken control of Al-Baraka on the outskirts of Kurmuk city after inflicting what it described as heavy losses on RSF forces. The week before, it also said it captured Karan Karan and Dokan. Taken together, those statements suggest Khartoum is trying to present a steady pattern of territorial advances in Blue Nile, though the battlefield picture remains difficult to verify independently from a single military account.

Blue Nile is not just another front in the war that began in April 2023 between Sudan’s regular army and the RSF. It is also territory where the SPLM-N has fought the government since 2011 in pursuit of self-rule in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. That history makes the current fighting especially volatile. The conflict is now combining a national power struggle with an older regional rebellion whose demands predate the present war by more than a decade.

The human cost of that overlap is growing. AFP reported that escalating clashes in recent months have displaced thousands of civilians from towns and rural areas across the state. As in other parts of Sudan, military gains claimed by one side do not necessarily translate into stability for residents. Instead, each new offensive can trigger further movement, insecurity and shortages.

The broader war has already devastated the country. International and local estimates cited in the report put the death toll in the tens of thousands, with around 13 million people displaced since the conflict erupted over disagreements about integrating the RSF into the formal military. Those numbers place the Blue Nile developments inside one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises rather than as an isolated regional flare-up.

The geography of the latest advances also matters. Blue Nile borders both Ethiopia and South Sudan, so military movements there have implications beyond Sudan’s internal map. Claims that retreating fighters were pushed toward border zones point to the risk of spillover pressures, arms movement and civilian flight across frontiers that are already difficult to police.

What can be stated with confidence from the available report is limited but important: the Sudanese army says it has expanded control in Blue Nile, its opponents had not publicly answered the claim at the time of reporting, and the state remains a convergence point for Sudan’s civil war and a separate armed struggle over autonomy. That combination makes every new territorial announcement consequential even before its lasting effect can be measured.